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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 of 1990 failed to achieve 
its promise of being an “emancipation proclamation for people with 
disabilities.”2  In response, Congress recently amended the ADA to be 
more inclusive and protective of individuals with physical or mental 
impairments.  Under the ADA Amendments Act,3 businesses and courts 
must place less importance on the gateway question of who is legally 
disabled.  Instead, they must focus more often on which disabled 
individuals merit accommodation.4  The purpose of these amendments is to 
affirmatively “remove[] societal and institutional barriers”5 so that disabled 
individuals can “fully participate in all aspects of society,”6 including the 
workplace.  This boils down to a goal of achieving a baseline level of equal 
opportunity between disabled and able-bodied individuals. 
Increasing the ADA’s coverage alone will not achieve this equal 
 
 * University of Pennsylvania Law School, Class of 2010.  Princeton University, Class 
of 2006. 
 1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994)). 
 2. Senator Edward M. Kennedy called the ADA a “bill of rights” and “emancipation 
proclamation” for people with disabilities.  See 135 Cong. Rec. 19,888 (1989) (transcribing 
Senator Kennedy’s statement). 
 3. The Americans With Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Public Law 110-
325, 122 Stat. 3554 [hereinafter “ADA Amendments Act”]. 
 4. In any given case, a number of factors will determine whether a disabled individual 
must be accommodated, including:  the nature and severity of his or her impairment; his or 
her qualifications for the job; the reasonability of the accommodation in question; and the 
relative hardship that granting the accommodation would impose upon the employer. 
 5. ADA Amendments Act § 2(a)(2). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). 
CHENGFINALIZED_EIGHT 3/31/2010  2:06:00 AM 
582 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
opportunity goal.  Given the broader class of individuals now protected 
under the amended ADA, and given concerns about the costs of 
accommodating disabled individuals, it is likely that businesses and courts 
will feel pressure to restrict plaintiffs to a relatively narrow right to 
accommodation.7  Additionally, absent other guidance which strengthens 
the duty to accommodate, employers are still likely to win the vast majority 
of disability discrimination lawsuits. 
Thus, while the ADA Amendments Act primarily focuses on 
expanding the definition of disability, courts interpreting the statute should 
refocus on the employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodations up 
to the point of undue hardship.8  Current case law is not clear as to what 
specific standards should be used to determine whether an accommodation 
is reasonable. 
This paper proposes that the courts should consider adopting a more 
concrete standard—such as an inquiry into whether the accommodated 
individual would still provide net economic benefit to the company—to 
clarify when an accommodation is reasonable.  This fact-based inquiry 
lends itself to a proof structure more similar to that which is found in the 
Canadian employment discrimination jurisprudence:  Canadian courts 
require an employer to provide a disabled employee with a reasonable 
accommodation unless the employer can prove that its refusal to do so was 
excused by a “bona fide occupational requirement.”9  Such a showing 
requires proof that the employer would suffer undue hardship by providing 
the accommodation.10  The Canadian approach provides a good example 
for the United States because Canada and the United States have a shared 
legal and cultural history; furthermore, Canada has been willing to 
implement progressive anti-discrimination laws, so it can provide a guide 
for the U.S. in appropriate circumstances.11 
 
 7. Courts tend to sympathize with businesses’ concerns about the cost of 
accommodation, but they may not be well-educated about the measures that disabled 
individuals require to have equal opportunities.  See Michael A. Stein, Same Struggle, 
Different Difference:  ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 
646 (2004).  Absent new case law, they are less likely to be willing to grant a broader right 
to accommodation. 
 8. In determining whether a given disability-related accommodation would be an 
undue hardship, the ADA directs negotiating parties or the court to consider the totality of 
the employer’s circumstances, including the nature and cost of the accommodation, the 
employer’s size and location, and the employer’s economic condition.  42 U.S.C. § 
12111(10) (1994). 
 9. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British 
Columbia (Government Service Employees’ Union), 1999 N.R. LEXIS 227, at *13 
[hereinafter Meiorin]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. In essence, the Canadian approach focuses on providing accommodations to all 
disabled individuals to the extent that is necessary to break down stigmas and to promote 
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The U.S. Supreme Court should adapt the Canadian strategy by 
shifting to employers the burden of production regarding the information 
most relevant to proving whether a disabled employee merits 
accommodation.  Employers should have to provide the evidence necessary 
to establishing both the estimated value the employee would provide over 
his or her work life and the estimated costs of providing the 
accommodation.12 
While the Canadian proof structure provides a useful comparison for 
American courts, I do not mean to suggest that the Canadian approach 
should be adopted without modification in the American context.  Indeed, 
in the U.S., the costs of accommodation are an increasingly large concern, 
especially given the newly broad coverage of the amended ADA and the 
current economic downturn.  Therefore, American courts should reaffirm 
that the right to accommodation is subject to the employee’s being 
qualified in the first place, and that employers are best suited to determine 
what qualifications are necessary for a particular job.  Additionally, the 
courts should recognize that reasonable accommodation does not require 
incurring either one-time costs or loss of job productivity to the extent that 
the cost of employing a disabled person would exceed the economic value 
of the work he or she performs over the course of employment. 
On the whole, my proposed standard and shifted burden of production 
would provide a fair balance between disabled employees’ interests in 
equal treatment and businesses’ underlying purpose of making money.  
Furthermore, it would bring the reality of what disabled workers experience 
closer in line with the ADA’s goal of equality. 
II. THE ADA OF 1990 
When it was first enacted in 1990, the ADA aimed “to provide a clear 
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.”13  Congress hoped that the disabled 
would gain protections similar to those enjoyed by people who experienced 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or 
age.14  In the employment context, the ADA aimed to increase access to the 
 
diversity and substantive equality in society.  See generally id. (replacing the conventional 
approach of categorizing discrimination as having either a “direct” or “adverse” effect with 
a unified approach focusing on whether an employer can show that a prima facie 
discriminatory standard is a bona fide occupational requirement). 
 12. This proposed standard and shifted burden of production does not provide courts 
with guidance as to how to assess the estimated value the employee would provide, and 
thus, how costly the maximally expensive reasonable accommodation would be.  More 
economic analysis is necessary to establish a procedure for establishing these values. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994). 
 14. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (1994) (“[U]nlike individuals who have experienced 
CHENGFINALIZED_EIGHT 3/31/2010  2:06:00 AM 
584 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
workplace by prohibiting overt discrimination and affirmatively requiring 
employers to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals 
with disabilities.15 
The ADA’s purpose was never fully realized.  A series of Supreme 
Court decisions narrowly circumscribed the coverage of the ADA,16 so 
many disability discrimination complaints were dismissed in federal court 
because the plaintiffs in question did not satisfy the statutory definition of 
disability.17  Indeed, some commentators assert that courts rejected up to 97 
percent of disability discrimination claims on this basis.18  Furthermore, 
contrary to initial expectations, the reasonable accommodation provision of 
the ADA generated relatively little conflict,19 as courts infrequently reached 
the question of whether an employer had satisfied its duty to reasonably 
accommodate a disabled employee.20 
 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals 
who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal 
recourse to redress such discrimination.”). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (1994).  The statute prohibits both intentional disparate 
treatment on the basis of disability and the failure to provide reasonable accommodation, 
and it counts both as types of discrimination. 
 16. See e.g., Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 
(2002) (concluding that an individual should not be held legally disabled unless he or she 
was prevented or severely restricted from performing tasks that are central to most people’s 
daily lives); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that an 
individual would not be considered legally disabled if he or she could manage his disability 
with “mitigating measures” such as glasses or medicines); see also Chai Feldblum, 
Restoring Congressional Intent and Protections Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
p. 16, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, & 
Pensions, Nov. 15, 2007 (“In recent years, the Supreme Court has restricted the reach of the 
ADA’s protections by narrowly construing the definition of disability contrary to 
Congressional intent.”). 
 17. See Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act:  Why the 
Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 522, 523 n. 7 (2008) (citing RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM:  THE FIRST 
DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 69-95 (2005); Ruth Colker, The Americans 
with Disabilities Act:  A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-103 
(1999); John W. Parry, Trend:  Employment Decisions Under ADA Title I—Survey Update, 
23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 294, 294-98 (1999); Study Finds Employers 
Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998)). 
 18. Feldblum, supra note 16, at 17. 
 19. Selmi, supra note 17, at 523-24. 
 20. Cf. Amy L. Allbright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey 
Update, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 328 (July/Aug. 2007) (implying 
that plaintiffs very frequently lost their cases because they did not qualify as disabled under 
the ADA). 
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III. THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 
Congress signed the ADA Amendments Act into law on September 
25, 2008 in response to the weak protections offered by the ADA of 1990.  
This Act declares that disabilities “in no way diminish a person’s right to 
fully participate in all aspects of society,”21 including participating in the 
workforce.  This Act broadens protections for the disabled by greatly 
expanding the covered class and by calling for the affirmative “remov[al] 
of societal and institutional barriers” in appropriate cases.22 
The Amendments Act’s broader vision of the protected class stems 
from the overly narrow construction of that class prior to the Act’s passage.  
Prior to the passage of the Amendments Act, the term “disability” was 
construed so narrowly that many individuals traditionally considered to be 
disabled were excluded from the ADA’s coverage, including individuals 
with epilepsy,23 muscular dystrophy,24 diabetes,25 an amputated limb,26 or a 
traumatic brain injury.27  This narrow coverage resulted from a series of 
Supreme Court decisions which drastically limited the facially broad 
language of the ADA.  In particular, Sutton v. United Air Lines narrowed 
the ADA’s coverage by requiring courts to inquire whether mitigating 
measures28 would allow impaired employees to perform “major life 
 
 21. ADA Amendments Act § 2(a)(2). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F. 3d 349, 351-52 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that an epileptic woman who woke up with bruises on her limbs after “shaking, kicking, 
salivating and, on at least one occasion, bedwetting” was not disabled under the ADA 
because “[m]any individuals fail to receive a full night of sleep”); Todd v. Academy Corp., 
57 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (dismissing an epileptic employee’s disability 
discrimination claim because anti-seizure medication alleviated many of his symptoms, and 
he therefore did not qualify as disabled under the ADA). 
 24. See e.g., McClure v. General Motors Corp., 75 Fed. Appx. 983 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that a man with muscular dystrophy was not disabled under the ADA because 
he had adapted “how he bathes, combs his hair, brushes his teeth, dresses, eats, and 
performs manual tasks by supporting one arm with the other, repositioning his body, or 
using a step-stool or a ladder”). 
 25. See e.g., Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F. 3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
the ADA did not protect a diabetic employee whose doctor ordered him to take a half-hour 
lunch break so he could manage his blood sugar levels). 
 26. See e.g., Williams v. Cars Collision Center, LLC, No. 06 C 2105 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 
2007) (holding that a woman with an amputated arm did not have a disability, but a mere 
“physical impairment,” because she was not “prevented or severely restricted from doing 
activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives”). 
 27. See e.g., Phillips v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (S.D. Ala. 1999) 
(denying that a man was disabled under the ADA even though he had suffered a traumatic 
brain injury which resulted in a four-month coma, dizziness, spasms in his arms and hands, 
slowed learning, and slowed speech). 
 28. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).  Mitigating measures can 
include wearing glasses, taking medicines, or other treatments. 
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activities”—if so, they would not be considered disabled.  Additionally, the 
subsequent case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams further limited the scope of the ADA by requiring an individual to 
first prove that he or she has “an impairment that prevents or severely 
restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance 
to most people’s daily lives.”29 
Like the original enactment of the ADA, the Amendments Act 
requires that an impairment “substantially limit one or more major life 
activities” in order to be considered a disability.30  Additionally, both 
statutes state that a person will be considered disabled if he or she has a 
record of such an impairment,31 or if he or she is regarded as having such an 
impairment.32  Despite these similarities between the language of the ADA 
and the Amendments Act, the Amendments Act prescribes a much more 
generous definition of disability than the ADA by adding rules of 
construction which make it clear that “the question of whether an 
individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand 
extensive analysis.”33 
The Amendments Act explicitly rejects the restrictive definitions of 
disability in Sutton34 and Williams.35  Thus, when determining whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity under the Amendments 
Act, courts can no longer take mitigating measures into account (with the 
exception of glasses and contact lenses).36  Additionally, the Act gives the 
phrase “major life activities” a far more expansive definition than that 
expressed in Williams.  The concept now includes, for instance, caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, 
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, 
 
 29. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 185 
(2002). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. 12102 § 3(1) (2008). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. ADA Amendments Act § 2(b)(5). 
 34. See ADA Amendments Act § 2(a)(4) (“the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton 
v. United Air lines, Inc. . . . and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of 
protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many 
individuals whom Congress intended to protect”). 
 35. See ADA Amendments Act § 2(b)(4)-(5) (criticizing Williams as promoting an 
“inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA”). 
 36. Despite Congress’s rejection of Sutton’s broad holding, Sutton would have come 
out the same way under the ADA and the Amendments Act because of this exception for 
glasses and contact lenses.  Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) 
(holding that Petitioners were not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because 
corrective measures such as glasses or contact lenses would enable them to function 
identically to those without similar impairments and thus not limit them in the performance 
of major life activities). 
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concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.37  The Amendments 
Act also rejects the EEOC regulations which defined the term 
“substantially limits” as “significantly restricted”38 because this definition 
“express[ed] too high a standard.”39  Instead, the Amendments Act requires 
that the EEOC issue regulations interpreting “substantially limits . . . 
[consistent] with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008.”40 
The Amendments Act is therefore very likely to cover individuals 
whom society would traditionally consider to be disabled (such as the 
previously mentioned employees with epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, brain 
injury, etc.).  However, the outer bounds of the Act’s coverage remain 
uncertain. 
Businesses will be concerned that the Amendments Act’s definition of 
major life activity is so broad that essentially anyone with an impairment 
can qualify as disabled.  Arguably, the effect of the Amendments Act is to 
expand the definition of disability so as to remove any likelihood that a 
disability claimant can be excluded on the grounds that a disability does not 
exist, and therefore to require that courts always consider issues of 
qualification for the job and reasonable accommodation by the employer.  
In this sense, the Amendments Act makes the ADA much more similar to 
another major anti-discrimination statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act.41  Title VII does not question whether a claimant in a racial 
discrimination case, for instance, is a member of a specific racial group; 
instead, it requires the court to assess the employee’s job qualifications and 
the employer’s potentially discriminatory actions.42 
The amended ADA prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] 
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.”43  
A qualified individual is “an individual with a disability who, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 
the [relevant] employment position.”44  The ADA makes clear that 
 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2008). 
 38. ADA Amendments Act § 2(a)(8). 
 39. Id. 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B) (2008); ADA Amendments Act § 506 (granting the 
EEOC, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Transportation authority to issue 
regulations interpreting the definitions of disability (including rules of construction)). 
 41. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2007) (stating, “It shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . ”). 
 42. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(m), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Desert 
Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973);. 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006). 
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prohibited discrimination includes not only “traditional discrimination,”45 
but also the failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] 
business.”46 
Indeed, the Amendments Act declares that “disabilities in no way 
diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but 
that people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded 
from doing so because of [discrimination].”47  Accordingly, the statute 
directs courts deciding cases under the ADA to focus on “whether entities 
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations” to treat the 
disabled equally,48 which may require “preferences in the form of 
‘reasonable accommodations’ that are needed for those with disabilities to 
obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without disabilities 
automatically enjoy.”49 
This language supports the view that the ADA’s mandate to 
reasonably accommodate is best viewed under the anti-subordination 
theory of discrimination.  The anti-subordination theory submits that the 
categorical exclusion of an individual from a workplace benefit because of 
his or her disability is arbitrary, degrading, and unfair because many 
disabilities are irrelevant to one’s capacity to do a job.50  For example, 
being wheelchair-bound does not affect an individual’s ability to work as a 
successful law professor.  Indeed, perhaps this law professor is only 
considered disabled in comparison to an arbitrary, societally-imposed 
baseline, where the environment is built to support walking individuals. 
While it is tempting to think of the ADA’s accommodation provision 
as a redistributive measure where the disabled are receiving an extra gain, 
 
 45. The phrase “traditional discrimination” is referring to the direct denial of formally 
equal treatment because of an individual’s disability.  See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) 
(2006) (including in the definition of discrimination the acts of “limiting, segregating, or 
classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or 
status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or 
employee”).  Such traditional discrimination against a disabled individual is analogous to 
the denial of a job opportunity to an individual because of her race or color under Title VII.  
See supra note 42. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2006). 
 47. ADA Amendments Act § 2(a)(2). 
 48. Id. (explaining that discrimination against the disabled can take the form of 
“prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and institutional barriers”). 
 49. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (emphasis in original); 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). 
 50. Cf. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465-66 (2001) (arguing that the anti-subordination 
theory explains the harm of first generation race or gender-based discrimination). 
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the anti-subordination theory is more appropriate.  Traditionally, many 
commentators thought that “real” anti-discrimination laws remedied the 
exclusion of similarly situated members of protected categories from 
workplace opportunity to achieve equality for certain historically 
marginalized groups.51  These commentators thought that “by affirmatively 
requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodations to existing or 
potential workers with disabilities, the ADA does more than simply level 
an uneven playing field.”52 
Michael Stein argues against this traditional view, contending that 
biological variations are viewed as abnormal partially “because a dominant 
group has imposed [artificial] conditions that are most favorable to its own 
circumstances.”53  Therefore, “ADA-mandated accommodations resemble 
antidiscrimination remedies not simply due to their comparable results, but 
because fundamentally they are antidiscrimination remedies.”54  The 
statute’s goal of removing the subordination of individuals with disabilities 
is a product of formal and equalizing justice, not redistributive justice, 
because it acknowledges that equal access to goods and opportunities in the 
workplace is not a special benefit.55  Rather, this equal access to benefits of 
employment is something that all employees who are qualified for their 
jobs are entitled to have.  Therefore, reasonable accommodations are 
suitable remedies to those artificial workplace conditions that historically 
excluded the disabled.56 
While the amended ADA is likely to be effective in addressing 
traditional discrimination against disabled individuals protected by the 
statute, it is less clear whether it will be as effective in reaching its “basic 
equal opportunity goal” with regards to individuals who require 
accommodation.57  The ADA clearly requires employers to provide 
qualified individuals with “reasonable accommodation,” but it leaves as a 
“great unsettled question” the matter of what can or should be considered a 
 
 51. Stein, supra note 7, at 582-83. 
 52. Id. (“Compelling employers to accommodate disabled workers, these scholars 
agree, pushes both the workplace equilibrium and its financial calculus beyond equality, and 
thus differentiates the ADA from its predecessors.  The conception of disability—related 
accommodations being distinct from Title VII antidiscrimination prohibitions is so 
pervasive that it has [made] the Supreme Court [more hostile to plaintiffs bringing failure to 
accommodate claims under the] ADA . . . .”). 
 53. Id. at 601. 
 54. Id. at 583 (emphasis omitted). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 637. 
 57. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (“[T]he Act specifies . . 
. that preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal 
opportunity goal.  The Act requires preferences in the form of ‘reasonable accommodations’ 
that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that 
those without disabilities automatically enjoy”). 
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reasonable accommodation.58  In Judge Posner’s words, reasonable 
accommodation “requires something less than the maximum possible care . 
. . [relative to] the benefits of the accommodation to the disabled worker as 
well as to the employer’s resources.”59 
IV. CURRENT CASE LAW FALLS SHORT OF ACHIEVING FORMAL 
EQUALITY FOR EMPLOYEES WHO REQUIRE REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION 
The Supreme Court articulated the current standard for when a given 
accommodation will be required under the ADA in the recent case, U.S. 
Airways Inc., v. Barnett.60  In that case, the Court denied the disabled 
plaintiff’s request for an exception to his company’s seniority system so he 
could keep his less physically demanding job.  The Court reasoned that 
accommodating the plaintiff by granting the exception was unreasonable 
“in the run of cases” because it would disrupt other employees’ 
expectations of “fair, uniform treatment” under the seniority system.61  
Additionally, the Court was unconvinced that the plaintiff showed any 
special circumstances which warranted a finding that the accommodation 
was reasonable in his specific situation, even though he had presented 
evidence that his employer reserved the right to change “any and all” of its 
hiring and promotion policies without advance notice.62  The Court 
concluded by noting that, even if the plaintiff had been able to show that 
the accommodation was reasonable, the employer could still assert the 
undue hardship defense.63 
Barnett’s holding is flawed for two reasons.  First, it does not provide 
specific enough guidance as to what accommodations businesses will be 
required to grant, ex ante.  Indeed, Barnett leaves open several important 
questions.  What constitutes a reasonable accommodation “in the run of 
cases”?  What is a reasonable accommodation in an individual case? 
Second, and more fundamentally, Barnett’s holding usually would not 
 
 58. Stein, supra note 7, at 646 (citing Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, 
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1, 8 (1996)). 
 59. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995); see 
also Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (establishing that reasonable 
accommodation does not require an employer to bear more than a “de minimis” cost). 
 60. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 61. Id. at 403-04. 
 62. See id. at 423-24 (Souter, J. and Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is hard to see the 
seniority scheme here as any match for Barnett’s ADA requests, since U.S. Airways 
apparently took pains to ensure that its seniority rules raised no great expectations.”). 
 63. Id. at 402 (stating that the employer will not be required to provide a reasonable 
accommodation if it proves that the requested accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship in the specific case at bar). 
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require an employer to grant a disputed accommodation, and it protects 
certain disabled individuals more than others.  Thus, it creates tension with 
the amended ADA’s stated goal of providing equal opportunity to all 
qualified individuals with disabilities.64  Under Barnett, it is far easier for a 
plaintiff to prove traditional discrimination than the failure to reasonably 
accommodate.  The plain language of the ADA does not contemplate any 
difference between types of discrimination in that there is an equally strong 
prohibition against traditional discrimination and the failure to reasonably 
accommodate.65  A plaintiff will be able to show traditional discrimination 
by proving his or her prima facie case, so long as the employer is not able 
to rebut the inference that its agents had an illegitimate motive.66  In 
contrast, a plaintiff seeking an accommodation must prove not only his or 
her prima facie case of discrimination, but must also prove either that the 
accommodation is reasonable in most cases or that there are special 
circumstances warranting the accommodation in his or her specific case (a 
difficult standard to meet under Barnett).67 
Businesses will likely press the courts to continue applying Barnett 
broadly due to their concerns that a less employer-friendly burden-shifting 
framework would require them to provide accommodations in more cases, 
including cases where opportunistic employees try to excuse bad work 
behavior by asserting the protections of the ADA.  This is a valid concern, 
but it is mitigated by limitations to an employer’s duty to accommodate.  
There are four main limitations:  the requirement that an individual be 
qualified,68 the requirement of reasonability,69 the defense of undue 
hardship,70 and the definition of “substantially limits.”71  These limitations 
would help ensure that a more employee-friendly standard would not 
excessively harm businesses. 
 
 64. A narrow interpretation of Barnett would limit its holding to the facts, e.g., to cases 
involving requested exceptions to a seniority system. 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual 
on the basis of disability with regard to employment.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2006) defines 
the word “discrimination” as including not only classic disparate treatment, but also as 
including the failure to provide reasonable accommodations, unless such accommodations 
would impose an undue hardship on the employer. 
 66. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 67. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 391 (holding that there were no special circumstances 
which warranted requiring the accommodation even though the employer had frequently 
bent its seniority rules for other employees). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006). 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2006). 
 70. See supra note 9 (illustrating how the Canadian courts allow defendant employers 
to show undue hardship). 
 71. The EEOC’s definition of the term “substantially limits” will determine the 
boundaries of the amended ADA’s coverage by helping to establish which individuals will 
be considered legally disabled. 
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Given Barnett’s holding, the ADA Amendments’ broadening of the 
protected class may not, in and of itself, be enough to achieve the ADA’s 
anti-discrimination mandate.  Barnett is narrowly written and lacks 
sufficient guidance as to what accommodations are reasonable; 
furthermore, it normally requires a showing of reasonableness in the “run” 
of similar cases, as it is difficult to show that special circumstances justify 
accommodation in the individual case.72  Thus, under the amended ADA 
and Barnett, the ADA’s protections may be broad, but they are also weak. 
V. TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE STANDARD FOR REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION 
A standard which requires employers to accommodate a disabled 
individual if he or she would provide net economic benefit to the company 
over his or her work life would further the formal equality goals of the 
Amendments Act while protecting employers’ economic interests.  This 
standard would require decision-makers to assess the employee’s 
qualifications for the job, the estimated value that the employee would 
provide over his or her work life, and the total cost of the accommodation.73  
Because of the undue hardship defense, this standard would not overly 
burden employers with excessive expenditures.74 
This standard is consistent with what Cass Sunstein has called the 
“best understanding” of reasonable accommodation:  “that an 
accommodation would be unreasonable if the costs exceeded the 
benefits.”75  However, cost-benefit analysis can be conducted not only with 
the costs to the employer of providing the accommodation and the benefits 
to the employer that the employee provides over his or her lifetime, but 
with other costs and benefits as well. 
In fact, another option is to consider the costs to the employer of 
providing the accommodation versus the benefits to the employee of using 
the accommodation.76  This option corresponds with Judge Posner’s 
conception of which costs and benefits to consider in Vande Zande.77  
Sunstein has criticized Judge Posner’s approach in Vande Zande because it 
 
 72. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 395, 403 (2002). 
 73. Employees are much less likely than employers to have access to the information 
that would allow them to calculate these figures. 
 74. See supra note 9 (allowing employers to show excessive expenditures as an undue 
hardship defense for accommodations they cannot make). 
 75. Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or Benefits:  
Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1895, 
1899 (2007). 
 76. See id. at 1908 (mentioning both the economic and emotional benefits 
accommodations provide disabled employees). 
 77. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995). 
CHENGFINALIZED_EIGHT 3/31/2010  2:06:00 AM 
2010] REEVALUATING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 593 
 
did not adequately consider the emotional benefits that an accommodation 
would provide a disabled employee.78  Sunstein argues that any 
measurement of benefits to the employee must account for both the 
economic and emotional benefits that an accommodation would provide.79  
However, even if Judge Posner’s version of cost-benefit analysis was 
modified to include assessments of emotional benefits, employers would be 
likely to undervalue these benefits because they have financial incentives to 
do so and because the accommodation is subjectively more important to the 
employee than the employer.  For this reason, it is preferable to use the 
benefits the employee’s work provides the company instead of the benefits 
the accommodation provides the employee, as the latter option would likely 
result in employers granting fewer accommodations than the ADA 
Amendments envision.80 
No matter which benefits one decides to take into account, requiring 
individualized cost-benefit analysis will refocus the debate on the costs of 
accommodation, a subject of heated controversy during the debates leading 
up to the ADA of 1990’s passage.81  Accommodations aren’t always as 
costly as many businesses first assume.  Employers participating in a recent 
Department of Labor study reported that accommodations usually were not 
very expensive and provided the company with tangible benefits.  This 
report states: 
“Of the employers who gave cost information related to 
accommodations they had provided, 251 out of 447 (56%) said 
the accommodations needed by employees and job applicants 
with disabilities cost absolutely nothing.  Another 164 (37%) 
experienced a one-time cost . . . . Of those accommodations that 
did have a cost, the typical one-time expenditure by employers 
was $600.”82 
 
 78. Cass Sunstein argues that the reduction in stigma experienced by disabled 
employees is a valid—even essential—consideration when assessing the economic benefits 
of accommodations to employees.  See Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1909 (discussing 
potential valuation of benefits through the employee’s “willingness to pay” for 
accommodation versus his or her “willingness to accept” lack of accommodation.  The latter 
accounts for emotional effects on the employee).  But see Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of 
Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to account in more than a cursory 
way for stigma that the plaintiff would face if she were not accommodated). 
 79. Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1909. 
 80. To assess the benefits the employee’s work would provide to the employer, 
decision-makers need to know labor costs.  These costs are not proprietary in some cases, 
for instance, in cases regarding union contracts.  However, employers have an incentive not 
to provide labor cost numbers in a legal proceeding where they would become public, both 
because labor costs may be proprietary (particularly skilled labor mix and costs) and 
because of privacy concerns for other employees in the same or similar job categories). 
 81. Allbright, supra note 20, at 328. 
 82. Job Accommodation Network, U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Disability 
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Furthermore, employers who had made accommodations for 
employees with disabilities reported multiple benefits as a result.83  The 
most frequently mentioned direct benefits were “(1) the accommodation 
allowed the company to retain a qualified employee, (2) the 
accommodation increased the worker’s productivity, and (3) the 
accommodation eliminated the costs of training a new employee.”84  The 
most widely mentioned indirect benefits employers received were “(1) the 
accommodation ultimately improved interactions with co-workers, (2) the 
accommodation increased overall company morale, and (3) the 
accommodation increased overall company productivity.”85 
Because accommodations often are not as costly as businesses would 
initially assume, and because they provide employers with valuable 
benefits, the proposed standard requiring individualized cost benefit 
analyses probably will result in more disabled individuals being 
accommodated.  Employers should not be too worried about this standard 
because it would not require employers to take on employees who would 
cause the company a net long-term economic loss, and it would not require 
them to take on such high economic costs relative to their short-term 
budgets as to cause undue hardship.86  Moreover, the standard would allow 
an employer to decide whether its employees are qualified for their jobs 
and whether their work would profit the company in the first place. 
Businesses might argue that an employee’s yearly compensation 
package already captures the exact economic value of the employee’s 
contributions to the company, so any granted accommodation makes the 
employee less valuable to the company and gives him or her extra 
compensation.  Additionally, businesses might argue that asking the 
company to make the accommodation and bear all the costs of doing so is 
unfair to their other workers in the “run of cases,”87 as these employees’ 
work may have become more difficult because of the accommodation—this 
is the very reasoning that underlies Barnett.88  According to these 
arguments, perhaps a disabled employee should have to pay part of the 
accommodation he or she is granted. 
 
Employment Policy, Workplace Accommodation:  Low Cost, High Impact 2 (2007), 
http://www.jan.wvu.edu/media/LowCostHighImpact.doc [hereinafter Job Accommodation 
Network]. 
 83. Id. at 2. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See generally Meiorin, supra note 9 (requiring employers to provide 
accommodations for disabled Canadians in the absence of a bona fide occupational 
requirement or undue economic hardship on the employer). 
 87. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-03 (2002). 
 88. Id.  Arguably, in Barnett, the other workers in similar jobs would lose benefits of 
their own seniority because of the disabled worker’s accommodation. 
CHENGFINALIZED_EIGHT 3/31/2010  2:06:00 AM 
2010] REEVALUATING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 595 
 
However, this idea runs afoul of the anti-subordination theory 
underlying the ADA, which states that all individuals who are qualified for 
their jobs deserve equal access to the benefits of employment.89  This theory 
argues that accommodations place disabled and able-bodied individuals at 
the baseline level of access to workplace opportunities that all qualified 
employees are entitled to have.  Therefore, forcing an employee to pay part 
or all of the accommodation is equivalent to impermissibly penalizing him 
or her because of his or her disability. 
Furthermore, accommodating a disabled employee can yield direct 
benefits to the employer, if the employee is known to be productive, 
because it will allow the business to keep a valuable worker.90  More 
generally, accommodating any employee, whether he or she is known to be 
productive or not, can yield indirect benefits to the employer in terms of 
improved employee morale and improved public image.91  Finally, 
accommodation can provide tangible benefits to other employees:  for 
instance, a reading device that magnifies print can benefit employees other 
than the disabled worker because the machine is durable and can be used 
by other individuals when the disabled employee is not using it.92  These 
benefits to the business and its other workers justify asking it to pay the 
cost of the accommodation. 
VI. ADAPTING THE CANADIAN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROOF 
STRUCTURE WOULD BETTER IMPLEMENT THIS PROPOSED STANDARD 
FOR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
American courts should consider adapting the Canadian framework by 
shifting the burden of production to employers regarding reasonable 
accommodation.  Employers should have to provide evidence relevant to 
establishing the estimated value that employees similarly situated to the 
plaintiff would provide over their work lives and the costs of providing the 
accommodation in question.  Canadian courts require employers to provide 
reasonable accommodations unless their refusals to do so are related to 
business necessity and the accommodations in question would cause undue 
hardship.93  The Canadian strategy of placing the burden of production on 
employers is well-suited to implementing my proposed standard because it 
would force employers to reveal hard-to-find information relevant to the 
 
 89. Stein, supra note 7, at 637-39 (discussing how the ADA helps eliminate some of the 
artificial disadvantages for disabled individuals in the workplace). 
 90. Job Accommodation Network, supra note 82, at 1. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 846 
(2007). 
 93. Meiorin, supra note 9, at *47. 
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inquiry of whether an employee would economically benefit the company. 
As a preliminary matter, the Canadian approach provides a useful lens 
through which to contemplate potential solutions to problems in the 
American employment law jurisprudence.  Indeed, Canada has developed a 
legal analysis for employment claims that is very similar to the one in this 
country.94  Yet, in general, Canada’s approach to employment 
discrimination issues is significantly more progressive than that of the 
U.S.’s, and the Canadian experience may provide a “roadmap” for moving 
U.S. law in that direction when appropriate.95 
The major anti-discrimination statutes in Canada include the Canadian 
Human Rights Act (“CHRA”) and its sister statutes at the provincial level.96  
These statutes “have an elevated legal status,” meaning that their provisions 
trump those of other non-constitutional sources of law.97  Unlike the 
American civil rights statutes,98 Canada does not use separate analyses for 
assessing intentional disparate treatment cases and unintentional disparate 
impact cases.99  Further, while the United States uses separate statutes to 
analyze different genres of discrimination,100 the CHRA does not 
 
 94. Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment:  
Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 118 (2006); see also 
Austen Parrish, Storm in a Teacup:  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007 
UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 637, 673 (2007) (pointing out that Canada “‘share[s] a common law 
heritage . . . liberal democratic and federal structures of government’ and other historical, 
societal, and legal similarities that make their laws particularly well suited to comparison”). 
 95. Seiner, supra note 94, at 118. 
 96. Canadian Human Rights Act [hereinafter CHRA]; Ontario Human Rights Code; 
British Columbia Human Rights Code. 
 97. Meiorin, supra note 9, at *40. 
 98. American courts still use separate analyses for so-called “disparate treatment” and 
“disparate impact” cases.  See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 
(1977) (detailing the systemic disparate treatment analysis in the Title VII context); Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 343 n.23 (1977) (inferring that the 
employer’s hiring policy was discriminatory from the “inexorable zero,” i.e., the employer’s 
complete failure to hire any minority taxi drivers); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971) (outlining disparate impact analysis in the Title VII context).  However, unifying the 
inquiries for disparate treatment and the disparate impact, like the Canadian system does, 
would further help the disabled to integrate into society and the workforce.  Such a unified 
system would also provide a simpler, more elegant analytical framework for thinking about 
disability discrimination cases.  Eliminating the separation between these analyses in the 
ADA context would be beneficial because:  the distinction is artificial, as few fact patterns 
fit neatly into one track or the other; the effect on the employee is the same, regardless of 
whether the employer discriminated intentionally or not; and the availability of damages 
will vary depending on which track the fact pattern is analyzed under.  See Seiner, supra 
note 94, at 132 (explaining the Canadian system). 
 99. See Meiorin, supra note 9, at *41-46 (collapsing the formerly distinct analyses for 
disparate impact cases and disparate treatment cases under Canadian law). 
 100. For instance, the ADA covers disability discrimination, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act covers age discrimination, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act covers 
race, sex, gender, national origin, and alienage discrimination. 
CHENGFINALIZED_EIGHT 3/31/2010  2:06:00 AM 
2010] REEVALUATING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 597 
 
differentiate among disability discrimination, sex discrimination, race 
discrimination, or any other type of covered discrimination.101  Finally, 
while the ADA is somewhat unique among American civil rights laws in its 
requirement that employers reasonably accommodate,102 the CHRA 
imposes a duty to accommodate for all types of covered discrimination.103  
Despite these differences between the ADA and the CHRA, the burden-
shifting aspects of the Canadian jurisprudence are worth considering and 
importing into the ADA context. 
The CHRA and its sister statutes aim to achieve “substantive equality” 
through “transformative measures” which make society and the workforce 
more egalitarian and diverse.104  Substantive equality requires more than 
achieving formal equality of treatment and opportunity; it also requires 
breaking down those systemic rules and practices which lead to inequitable 
results.  The Canadian Supreme Court criticizes the formal equality model 
because this model does not require decision-makers to “challenge the 
imbalances of power, or the discourses of dominance, such as racism, able-
bodyism, and sexism, which result in a society being designed well for 
some and not for others,” and because it “allows those who consider 
themselves ‘normal’ to continue to construct institutions and relations in 
their image, as long as others, when they challenge this construction, are 
‘accommodated.’”105  In contrast, the Court lauds the ideal of substantive 
equality underlying the CHRA, which “abandon[s] the idea of ‘normal’ and 
work[s] for genuine inclusiveness.”106 
The Supreme Court of Canada most recently addressed the means by 
which the Canadian Human Rights Tribunals shall work towards the goal 
of substantive equality in British Columbia (Public Service Employee 
 
 101. See CHRA Part I (3)(1) (“For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual 
orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon has 
been granted.”). 
 102. The only other statute which requires reasonable accommodation in the 
employment context is the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 
amendment to Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (1978). 
 103. See CHRA Part I (15)(2) (“For any practice mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) to be 
considered to be based on a bona fide occupational requirement and for any practice 
mentioned in paragraph (1)(g) to be considered to have a bona fide justification, it must be 
established that accommodation of the needs of an individual or a class of individuals 
affected would impose undue hardship on the person who would have to accommodate 
those needs, considering health, safety and cost.”).  
 104. Meiorin, supra note 9, at *39; CHRA; Ontario Human Rights Code; British 
Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch.210 (2008).  Similarly, the Amendments 
Act contemplates that disability should not be a barrier to full participation in society and 
the workforce, so that the affirmative removal of stereotypes and of societal and institutional 
barriers is an appropriate anti-discrimination remedy.  ADA Amendments Act. 
 105. Meiorin, supra note 9, at *37. 
 106. Id. at *38. 
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Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government Service 
Employees’ Union (Meiorin).107  In this case, the female plaintiff was fired 
from her job as a firefighter for having failed the provincial government’s 
new aerobic standard for physical fitness.108  The Court found this aerobic 
standard to be discriminatory because 65 to 70 percent of male applicants 
passed this test on their initial attempts, while only 35 percent of female 
applicants had similar success.109  The Court held that the Government had 
not discharged its burden of showing that it had accommodated the plaintiff 
up to the point of undue hardship because it presented “no credible 
evidence” showing that the prescribed aerobic capacity was necessary for 
either men or women to perform the work of a forest firefighter 
satisfactorily.110 
Meiorin is notable for many reasons,111 but for the purposes of this 
analysis, it is relevant because it is the most recent Canadian Supreme 
Court case to address an employer’s duty to accommodate.  Like its 
predecessors, Meiorin reaffirms that once the employee proves that he or 
she was treated differently because of his or her disability, the employer 
bears the burdens of production and proof to demonstrate that it would 
suffer undue hardship if it were to provide the accommodation in question 
to individual employees sharing the characteristics of the plaintiff.112 
 
 107. Canada has Human Rights Tribunals at the federal and provincial levels.  These 
Tribunals implement the Human Rights statutes. 
 108. Meiorin, supra note 9, at *11. 
 109. Id. at *17.  It should be noted that, in contrast to the American approach, the 
Canadian approach requires employers to accommodate individuals who face discrimination 
on any prohibited grounds (not just disability or religion). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Meiorin is the case which first made clear that the goal of Canadian Human Rights 
legislation was to create substantive equality.  Id. at *39.  Furthermore, in Meiorin, the 
Supreme Court of Canada laid down a framework that unified the analyses for disparate 
treatment and disparate impact and that set a new test for when an employer would be 
required to grant an employee a workplace accommodation.  In the first step of this new test, 
the Court required the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that 
the practice or policy in question has a discriminatory effect.  In the second step, it shifted 
the burden to the employer to prove that:  (1)its practice was enacted for a purpose rationally 
related to business necessity; (2) it enacted its practice in the good faith belief that the 
practice was reasonably necessary to achieve this purpose; and (3) the practice was 
reasonably necessary to achieve this purpose.  For an employer to prove that the practice 
was reasonably necessary, it must demonstrate it would suffer undue hardship if it provided 
accommodation of individual employees sharing the characteristics of the plaintiff.  Id. at 
*48-49. 
 112. Id. at *61.  See also Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley (Vincent) v. 
Simpson-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (directing the employer to pay the employee the 
difference between her earnings as a part-time employee and what she would have earned as 
a full-time employee because there was no evidence that further steps would have caused 
undue hardship and would have been unreasonable); Bhinder v. CN, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561 
(finding that the employer’s hard-hat rule was a bona fide occupational requirement and it 
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Canadian discrimination law aims to be more far-reaching than 
American discrimination law; indeed, some of its cases criticize American 
discrimination law for being too parsimonious.113  Thus, it is inappropriate 
to import the Canadian approach completely into American law. 
In light of both the similarities and the differences between the CHRA 
and the ADA,114 U.S. courts should adapt the Canadian approach by 
placing upon the employer the burden of production regarding otherwise 
hard-to-find information relevant to whether a disabled employee would 
economically benefit the company.  By doing so, the courts would create a 
framework which would fortify the protections of the Amendments Act and 
would help to achieve the Act’s goal of providing a baseline level of equal 
opportunity to both able-bodied and disabled individuals. 
VII. CONCLUSION:  RETHINKING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
To sum up the argument, the broadened coverage of the amended 
ADA will be insufficient, in and of itself, to achieve an adequate baseline 
level of equal opportunity between the disabled and able-bodied.115  Those 
disabled individuals who require reasonable accommodation will still have 
difficulty fully participating in the workforce under the ADA Amendments 
and Barnett, even though the ADA does not distinguish between 
 
would be an undue burden for them to make an exception to the rule). 
 113. See e.g., Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 
(rejecting the American “de minimis” standard for undue hardship as too lenient and noting 
that employers are obligated to endure some hardship as members of an egalitarian and 
diverse society). 
 114. The CHRA aims to be far more inclusive and protective than the ADA does.  In 
fact, the Canadian employment discrimination jurisprudence is too plaintiff-friendly to 
import without modification into the American context.  In Meiorin, the Supreme Court of 
Canada made clear that the goal of Canadian Human Rights legislation was to strike down 
actions or policies with discriminatory effects—regardless of whether there was any intent 
to discriminate, and regardless of whether such actions or policies adversely affected one 
individual or many—so as to recreate a society which did not use discriminatory norms.  In 
contrast, the ADA only mandates that qualified disabled workers must be granted 
accommodations on the individual level so they can fully participate in the workforce.  The 
ADA does not envision creating sweeping systemic changes which alter what is considered 
normal, and it does not contemplate completely reforming the workforce so that it suits the 
disabled and the able-bodied equally well. 
 115. The Amendments Act charges the EEOC, the Attorney General, and the Secretary 
of Transportation with issuing regulations, including rules of construction, to implement the 
definitions of disability.  My argument assumes that the EEOC and other governmental 
agencies will not create a restrictive definition of “disability,” so disabled individuals 
generally will not face problems in proving this threshold requirement.  Indeed, the 
Amendments Act commands the EEOC to promulgate more inclusive definition of 
“substantially limits” for the purposes of determining who is disabled.  This definition will 
be binding on the courts. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(5), 122 
Stat. 3553  (2008). 
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individuals who experience traditional discrimination and individuals who 
are denied reasonable accommodation. 
To remedy this inconsistency, American courts should require 
employers to make individualized cost-benefit assessments of disabled 
employees when deciding whether the accommodations in question are 
reasonable.  Such an analysis will have to include information about the 
worker’s qualifications and productivity as well as the objective costs of 
accommodation.  Under this proposed standard, employers will have to 
accommodate qualified employees if it is economic to do so, unless 
providing the accommodation would lead to undue hardship.116 
The U.S. Supreme Court will have to reassess current case law and 
move away from Barnett to implement this proposed standard.  Because 
the Canadian jurisprudence has illustrated a way to achieve greater equality 
without excessively harming businesses, the Court should consider 
adapting the Canadian approach to implement this standard.  The Court 
should require employers to produce information relevant to establishing 
the estimated value an employee would provide over his or her work life 
and the estimated costs of providing the accommodation. 
Since the Court recently enumerated the burden-shifting framework 
for analyzing reasonable accommodations in Barnett, it may be reluctant to 
revisit the issue so soon.  However, the Amendments Act explicitly 
requires reasonable accommodations for the disabled in order to equalize 
workplace opportunity, and Barnett does not provide an adequate 
framework for deciding what accommodations are reasonable.  Therefore, 
another Court visit is needed to strengthen and develop the protections of 
the Amendments Act. 
 
 116. See Meiorin, supra note 9, at *61 (requiring employers to demonstrate that 
accommodating individuals with similar characteristics would pose an undue economic 
burden). 
